The Supreme Court should explain recusals in climate cases

In 2025, the Colorado Supreme Court allowed the claims to proceed under state law. Suncor and Exxon Mobil argue that the Constitution and the Clean Air Act bar state-law claims involving interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions. Boulder argues that its case seeks compensation for alleged harms within Colorado, not an order controlling emissions.

The justices must also address a threshold dispute: The companies say the U.S. Supreme Court can review the Colorado ruling now; Boulder says it cannot at this stage. None of those questions has been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in this appeal. The answer could affect whether Boulder’s lawsuit can continue under state law, making the composition of the bench a matter of public consequence, not court housekeeping.

The record explains the absence, not the reason

The clerk’s letter says Alito will no longer participate. It does not say why. Alito also stepped aside from an earlier Supreme Court petition arising from the same litigation in 2023. That history makes a clear explanation more useful, but it does not supply one.

Financial disclosures are part of the public discussion. Courthouse News Service reports that Alito held stock in seven oil, gas and mining-sector companies, while CBS identifies ConocoPhillips and Phillips 66 among his disclosed holdings. Neither Exxon Mobil nor Suncor appears among his latest disclosed holdings. The clerk’s letter does not connect any investment to his decision.

The distinction matters. A disclosed holding in an industry is not, by itself, proof of why a justice withdrew from a case involving that industry. Nor should the absence of an explanation be treated as evidence of misconduct. The accountability problem is that the public is left without the court’s reasoning at all.

A workable standard would serve both sides

The Supreme Court’s 2023 ethics code does not call for justices to leave cases whenever someone objects to their participation. It presumes they are impartial and says they have a duty to sit unless disqualified. It also calls for disqualification when a justice’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned under an objective standard.

That duty to sit is the strongest argument against reflexive recusals. Litigants should not be able to choose their judges by raising unsupported objections, and the public benefits when cases are heard by justices who have a duty to participate. But that argument supports consistent decisions grounded in a stated standard; it does not explain why the court should announce a withdrawal without even a brief account of the basis for it.

A sensible reform would distinguish an explanation from a defense of every private detail. The court should adopt a practice of giving a concise public reason when a justice recuses and explain how it evaluates financial interests across cases. The same criteria should apply whether the litigants are local governments seeking climate damages or companies trying to block their claims. The current ethics code supplies a test for participation, not a requirement to explain every recusal publicly.

The court need not resolve the merits of Boulder’s allegations to address that gap. Before Oct. 5 arguments, it can make clear why one justice will not hear this appeal. The Senate Judiciary Committee, for its part, should hold a public hearing on recusal transparency and ask the court to account for how its standards are applied. That hearing cannot decide the Boulder case. It can press the institution responsible for choosing who sits in judgment to make those choices understandable.