NATO commander outlines three-stage plan to defend alliance territory

What are the three stages in Grynkewich’s plan?

The first stage is to block an initial attack. If it continues, NATO would seek to blunt it and prevent further advances. As a final step, if necessary, the alliance would target the forces and systems sustaining the assault, as Grynkewich described the plan.

The sequence moves from stopping an attack at the outset to disrupting the capacity to continue it. Grynkewich’s presentation discussed land forces, sensors and autonomous systems, as well as attacks on command and supply capabilities. Those elements describe a military response in progressively broader terms; they do not make a particular attack or battlefield the subject of the plan.

Grynkewich framed the purpose as protecting NATO members and their people. “We have no plans, no intentions, and no ambitions beyond the protection of our people and the defence of our territory,” he said, Euronews reported.

He has also called for allied coordination in responding to Russian activity and continued support for Ukraine. For an alliance of 32 countries, coordination is a central part of the posture: members need to agree on how to respond and bring their capabilities to bear. The July NATO summit in Ankara reaffirmed the allies’ collective-defense commitment, known as Article 5: an attack on one member is treated as an attack on all.

Readiness and deterrence are linked in Grynkewich’s argument. A force able to block an attack and disrupt the systems sustaining it may discourage an adversary from trying, while his public rejection of war as an aim is meant to make the defensive purpose clear. That is the commander’s stated logic, not a forecast that war will follow.

What does Denmark’s assessment say about the threat?

Denmark’s Defence Intelligence Service assessed on Sept. 24 that the risk of a limited Russian military attack on one or more NATO countries bordering Russia was low but growing. It said it had no indications Russia planned an outright invasion and assessed that such an invasion was highly unlikely, in its threat assessment.

The Danish service also assessed that Russia had increased sabotage, cyberattacks and drone activity in Europe. In its view, further hybrid attacks could seek to disrupt support for Ukraine and divide NATO. Those are the intelligence service’s assessments of activity and possible aims, rather than proof of responsibility for every incident attributed to Russia.

The report noted a Sept. 14 incident off Gedser, when a Russian frigate fired flares at a Danish military helicopter. Denmark’s service described it as its most serious recent example of aggressive Russian conduct toward Danish military units. Such incidents help explain why governments are paying attention to airspace and military readiness, but they are distinct from the service’s assessment that an outright invasion is highly unlikely.

The Associated Press counted at least 211 incidents since 2022 that Western officials blamed on Russia. The tally reflects those officials’ attributions; it does not establish Russian responsibility for each incident.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned that Russia might escalate with drone or rocket attacks on European countries supporting Ukraine. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker cautioned against reading the incidents as a sign that conflict was beginning and urged care not to overreact, the AP reported. Their differing emphasis captures the challenge facing alliance leaders: they must prepare for threats without presenting every incident as the start of a wider war.

For civilians, the consequences of an incursion can be immediate even without a broader conflict. The AP reported that people in Vilnius were told to seek shelter after a drone entered Lithuanian airspace. The episode showed how military tensions can reach residents in a city, while not establishing that conflict is imminent.

Why are drones a test of NATO’s readiness?

Grynkewich’s account included sensors and other technology among the tools for defending alliance territory. NATO is also building a connected system to detect and intercept drones. The AP reported that NATO commander spokesperson Col. Martin O’Donnell said the network was still being established and had not yet brought down any drones.

The AP also reported that some NATO countries have struggled in drone-warfare exercises and have faced difficulties detecting and responding to drones entering their airspace. That gap between announced readiness and capabilities still being put in place makes implementation an important measure of the alliance’s posture.

O’Donnell said member countries were deploying more sensors and other technology to detect and counter drones. The network’s stated purpose is detection and interception; its current status underscores that the alliance is still building that capability. The task for NATO members is to turn equipment and investment into a system that can identify and respond to drone threats.

At the July summit in Ankara, NATO announced more than $40 billion in planned investment in counter-drone capabilities over five years. The allies also reaffirmed Article 5, connecting the focus on practical military capability with the alliance’s collective-defense commitment, according to the summit overview.

The spending pledge makes counter-drone technology a clear alliance priority. For residents affected by airspace incursions, the practical question is whether detection and interception improve as the system is built. NATO’s leaders will need to show how the investment is being delivered and how the capability is working, while keeping the distinction Grynkewich drew between preparation for an attack and a desire for war.